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Go Big or Go Home? Lessons Learned from the 
Colombian Victims’ Reparation System
Nelson Camilo Sánchez and Clara Sandoval- Villalba
A Introduction
Colombia has faced an internal armed conflict for over five decades. While a 
peace agreement was signed in 2016 by the Colombian government and the farc, 
the largest guerrilla group (The Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces), vio-
lence persists in many parts of the country. After decades of conflict, there are vast 
numbers of victims of the atrocious crimes that have been committed. According 
to the official National Registry of Victims, more than eight million people have 
been victims of violence, equivalent to 19% of the overall population in the coun-
try. The great majority of these victims are internally displaced persons (idp s), 
many of which have suffered more than one serious human rights violation. As 
of 1 January 2019, there were 218,881 direct victims of homicide and 37,654 direct 
victims of enforced disappearance since 1985.1
As these numbers indicate, providing reparation in Colombia is no small task. 
In response to this challenge, Colombia has put in place various tools to respond 
to the harms caused to victims in a holistic manner, including a very ambitious 
Domestic Reparation Programme (drp).2 This chapter questions whether these 
tools have been effective, and reflects on what lessons have been learned.
The assessments of Colombia’s ambitious drp are wide ranging.3 Some have 
positively evaluated aspects of the model, commending its aspiration to follow 
 1 Single Registry of Victims, https:// cifras.unidadvictimas.gov.co (accessed July 2019).
 2 In a recent interview about Colombia, international expert Mark Freeman highlighted am-
bition as ‘one of the things that characterizes Colombia.’ In Freeman’s words: ‘for better and 
for worse, they [Colombians] can’t do anything without being extremely ambitious. I don’t 
mean to say they’re not realistic, but they push themselves to the limits.’ Mark Freeman, ‘How 
You Can Negotiate Justice and Peace’, An interview by Thierry Cruvellier for justiceinfo.net, 
30 August 2018, www.https:// www.justiceinfo.net (accessed July 2019).
 3 There is a wide range of specialised academic literature about the topic. See, for instance, 
Christine Evans, The right to reparation in international law for victims of armed conflict, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press 2012); Brett Roddy & Lina Malagon, ‘Overcoming the 
Original Sin of the “Original Condition”: How Reparations May Contribute to Emancipatory 
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international legal standards as well as its originality, its goal of expansion, and 
the creativity with which many debates and challenges have been addressed.4 
On the other hand, it is common to find critical and pessimistic evaluations 
that underscore the model’s complexity, its lack of practical operability, the 
gap between law and implementation, and the potential for re- victimisation 
resulting from the creation of false expectations.5
The institutional structure in Colombia today allows for many reflections, 
and much of the praise and criticism that has been imputed to the drp is 
merited. Our general evaluation of the model is mixed: it is neither so disas-
trous or cynical, nor is it so marvelous. As we cannot discuss each dimension 
of the reparation puzzle in Colombia in detail here given its complexity, we 
will concentrate on highlighting some of the drp’s key characteristics. From 
these reflections, lessons can be drawn which permit transitional justice and 
human rights practitioners to reflect on the challenges of planning and opera-
tionalising robust reparation programmes and systems, like that of Colombia, 
in contexts of generalised institutional fragility as those found in conflict and 
post- conflict situations.
The structure of the chapter will be the following:  in the first section, we 
provide a brief overview of the reparation tools available in the country, in 
which we will include the existing options for accessing reparations, both in 
transitional and non- transitional mechanisms. This means that in Colom-
bia, there is a plurality of mechanisms to provide reparation to victims of the 
armed conflict and not exclusively its drp under Law 1448/ 2011 (Victims and 
Land Restitution Law – here in after Law 1448). This is something to be not-
ed as co- existence of systems to provide reparation tends to be overlooked in 
Peacebuilding’, (2013) 14(3) Hum Rts Rev 257; and Nicole Summers, ‘Colombia’s Victims’ 
Law:  Transitional Justice in a Time of Violent Conflict?’ (2012) 25 Harvard Hum Rts J 219. 
There is also a good number of policy assessment studies. See, Kathryn Sikkink, Phuong 
Pham, Douglas Johnson, Peter Dixon, Bridget Marchesi & Patrick Vinck ‘Evaluation on Inte-
gral Reparations Measures in Colombia’, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and The Har-
vard Humanitarian Initiative, 2015; Cristián Correa, ‘From Principles to Practice: Challenges 
of Implementing Reparations for Massive Violations in Colombia’, International Center for 
Transitional Justice, 2015; and Nelson Camilo Sánchez & Adriana Rudling ‘Reparations in 
Colombia: Where to? Mapping the Colombia Landscape of reparations for Victims of the 
Internal Armed Conflict’, The Reparations, Responsibility and Victimhood in Transitional So-
cieties Project, Belfast, 2019.
 4 Sikkink et al., ibid; Rodrigo Uprimny, ‘Transformative Reparations of Massive Gross Human 
Rights Violations:  Between Corrective and Distributive Justice’, (2009) 27(4) Neth Q Hum 
Rts, 625.
 5 Correa (n 3); Amnesty International, ‘Colombia: The Victims and Land Restitution Law: An 
Amnesty International Analysis’, AI Index: AMR 23/ 018/ 2012, 17 April 2012.
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specialised literature on the subject and remains a significant aspect of any 
reparation process.6 In the second section, we analyse the progress and chal-
lenges in providing reparation to victims under Law 1448, with particular em-
phasis on some particular forms of reparation like compensation, rehabilita-
tion and land restitution. The third section reflects on the system taking into 
account the theory on reparation but also similar debates in other countries 
facing similar challenges. We will also bear in mind the challenges faced by 
the system in terms of articulation, coordination, and efficiency. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with some brief conclusions and lessons learned not only 
about Colombia but the overall challenge of providing reparation to victims in 
conflict and post- conflict situations.
B A Plurality of Mechanisms
Colombia has a relatively complex institutional framework with regards to 
reparation. First, there is an important set of norms that regulate the condi-
tions under which a person who has suffered harm can access reparation. This 
framework includes provisions under private and public law regulating dam-
ages and torts. Second, specific legal instruments regulate the right to repara-
tion of victims of the Colombian armed conflict. Various institutions including 
judicial bodies, are responsible for operationalising these laws and granting 
protection to individuals whose rights have been violated.
1 Reparation through the Ordinary Judicial System
Under Colombian law, a gross violation of human rights constitutes a crime. 
Colombian criminal law gives the victims of a crime the right to comprehen-
sive reparation for the harm suffered from the perpetrator or third party de-
termined responsible  – this extends beyond compensation. Constitutional 
jurisprudence has reiterated that victims’ right to reparation is not limited ex-
clusively to economic indemnification.7
Additionally, the injuries caused can be the object of litigation before civ-
il courts to seek reparation from those who are liable, whether in their per-
sonal or corporate capacity. Colombian civil law provides for both direct and 
indirect (vicarious) extra- contractual civil liability (tort) actions. The former 
takes place in accordance with article 2341 of the Colombian Civil Code, and 
 6   
 7 Constitutional Court, Decisions C- 580 of 2002, C- 228 of 2003 and C- 250 of 2011.
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under such actions, the person who commits an illicit act (through negligence, 
willful misconduct, or fraud) and causes such damage (any bodily, moral, or 
material injury) is obliged to indemnify the damage. In the latter case, which 
is governed by article 2347 of the Colombian Civil Code, a principal is liable 
to afford reparation for an injury caused by the fault of its employees in the 
performance of their duties.
Finally, if state officials participated in the events, the system allows vic-
tims, once state responsibility is recognised, to request reparations both at the 
domestic and international level. Since 2002, the Council of State (Consejo de 
Estado), the highest Court in Colombia for acts or omissions committed by the 
state or its entities, has incorporated in its jurisprudence the criteria for repa-
ration established by the Inter- American Court on Human Rights (IACtHR) in 
its well- established jurisprudence on the subject.8
Colombia has also ratified the most important international treaties appli-
cable to armed conflicts and their consequences, including the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human 
Rights, the Geneva Conventions and their Optional Protocols as well as the 
Rome Statute. It has equally accepted the jurisdiction of UN treaty monitoring 
bodies such as the Human Rights Committee and the IACtHR. This means that 
as a general rule, after individuals in Colombia have exhausted domestic reme-
dies, they can approach any of these bodies claiming that the state has violated 
their rights and seeking reparations for harms suffered.
2 Transitional Reparation Mechanisms
In response to the armed conflict, in the early 1990s, the Colombian state 
began to implement measures to help victims access basic services such as 
health, education, and funeral expenses. These measures, which were initially 
called “humanitarian aid,” included monetary compensation for people who 
were victimised by what the law deemed to be terrorist acts and, later, by acts 
derived from the conflict. In this way, the state created the beginning of what 
would later become the drp. In the early 2000s, as a consequence of demobil-
isation processes of paramilitary groups and victims’ mobilisation, the Colom-
bian Congress passed a series of laws that are part and parcel of the current 
normative transitional justice framework for reparation.
 8 Among other examples: Council of State, Third section, 19 October 2007, decision 29273, M.P. 
Enrique Gil Botero; Council of State, Third section, 20 February 2008, decision 16996, M.P. 
Enrique Gil Botero; Council of State, Third section, 14 September 2011, decision 19031 and 
38222, M.P. Enrique Gil Botero.
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a Reparations under the Justice and Peace Law
In the context of the demobilisation of the right- wing paramilitary groups that 
started in late 2002, in July 2005, the Colombian Congress passed Law 975/ 2005 
(known as the Justice and Peace Law) creating a system to handle the most se-
rious violations committed by paramilitary personnel and guerrillas, including 
disappearances, massacres and sexual violence, through special chambers for 
criminal trials. The system was similar to the one established in South Africa 
under the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where it was imperative that 
perpetrators confessed all their crimes to be eligible for an amnesty, with the 
difference that in Colombia, the confession would happen within the frame-
work of criminal proceedings, and there would nonetheless be a punishment 
albeit attenuated by the confession.9 Although, the framework allowed for vic-
tim participation,10 victims had to wait until confessions were provided and 
for the stages of criminal responsibility to be over, to later have their reparation 
requests heard in a special stage called the “reparation incident.” There, in ad-
dition to listening to the victims, the Tribunal would assess the damages and 
decide on the reparation measures to be later ordered as part of the sentence.11
Law 975 follows international law standards on reparation. As per compen-
sation measures, the system established that the main person responsible for 
the payment of compensation would be the defendant, but that if the per-
son lacked resources, the armed bloc to which the person belonged or the 
armed group – as a collective – should take on this responsibility on solidarity 
grounds. For this purpose, the Law created a reparations fund where all assets 
given by or taken from the demobilised members of armed groups were to be 
directed.12
In a country with a strong legal culture, it was no surprise that the first at-
tempt to provide reparation to victims was to take place through courts. How-
ever, the system soon failed to provide reparation to victims, and to do so in a 
prompt manner. The processes under the justice and peace law turned out to 
be – like in any criminal trial - , extremely slow. Furthermore, victims were not 
always given proper access to the system and there were not enough assets to 
provide reparation. Indeed, the Ministry of Justice in Colombia calculated that 
 9 Indeed, in Colombia, perpetrators would have to confess all their crimes and give up their 
assets in furtherance of reparation to victims, in order to obtain the special benefits of the 
law, which were imprisonment between 5 to 8 years.
 10 Catalina Díaz, ‘Colombia’s Bid for Justice and Peace’, International Center for Transitional 
Justice, 2007.
 11 Law 1592, Article 24. Constitutional Court Decision C- 180/ 14.
 12 Law 975, Article 54.
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by 2014, there were 5,190 demobilised combatants pending trial and judges 
had only rendered 26 judgments. This figure gives an indication of the massive 
challenges ahead if victims were to secure reparation through this Law.13 In ad-
dition to that, the reparation orders issued by the Justice and Peace Law judges 
proved to be extremely difficult to implement due to the complex institutional 
processes that needed to be put in motion to make them happen and the costs 
they demanded.14
In light of the failure of Law 975 to provide prompt reparations to victims, in 
2008 the government issued Decree 1290 (regulation of the Justice and Peace 
Law), which created an ‘Administrative Programme for Individual Repara-
tions.’15 This decree established that victims of murder, enforced disappear-
ance, kidnapping, torture, sexual violence and forced recruitment, duly regis-
tered in the judicial processes of the Justice and Peace Law could obtain partial 
compensation, in the amounts indicated in the Decree, from the reparation 
fund, while legal proceedings were still taking place.
b Reparations under the Victims and Land Restitution Law
In light of the profound limitations of both the ordinary system for repara-
tions, and the mechanisms associated with the demobilisation process, vic-
tims of the conflict organised themselves and demanded adequate and effec-
tive remedies to claim reparation. This gave rise to what would become Law 
1448, in 2011. Besides Law 1448, three Decrees with force of law were enacted 
to regulate the right to reparation of indigenous groups, black communities, 
afrodescendants and Roma.16
Law 1448 incorporated both individual and collective forms as well as mate-
rial and symbolic forms of redress. Among the individual forms of reparation, it 
included compensation, rehabilitation for physical and mental health through 
the Programa de Atención Psicosocial y Salud Integral de Víctimas (papsivi), a 
land restitution process, satisfaction measures, and other forms of restitution 
such as housing, education and employment measures, particularly for dis-
placed persons. The law includes victims of armed groups, regardless of whether 
 13 Ministry of Justice, ‘Justicia transicional en Colombia’ http:// www.justiciatransicional.gov.
co/ Justicia- Transicional/ Justicia- transicional- en- Colombia, (accessed 8 April 2019).
 14 For example, Corte Suprema de Justica, Segunda instancia, Sala de Casación Penal, Jorge 
Ivan Laverde Zapata, Magistrate Luis Guillermo Salazar Otero, 6 June 2012.
 15 República de Colombia, Decree no 1290, 22 April 2008, https:// www.refworld.org/ 
cgi- bin/ texis/ vtx/ rwmain/ opendocpdf.pdf?reldoc=y&docid=542d161d4, (accessed 8 
April 2019).
 16 Respectively Decrees 4622/ 2001, 4635/ 2011 and 4634/ 2011.
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they have demobilised, and also of state agents, something that had not been 
covered under the Justice and Peace Law.
An important principle giving internal coherence to the forms of repara-
tion under Law 1448 was the decision to provide victims with a holistic and 
integral approach to reparation. This principle applies not only through the 
understanding of the way different forms of reparation should be amplified, 
for example, by providing victims with financial education for the investment 
of compensation, but also through team work where dialogue and reflection 
about harm, truth, and moving forward are encouraged. The Law also includes 
the imprint of transformative reparations.17
The law establishes a new institutional framework called the snariv (Siste-
ma Nacional de Atención y Reparación a las Víctimas), exclusively for the rep-
aration of victims under this Law. It establishes new structures including the 
Victims Unit, the Land Restitution Unit, the National Center for Historic Mem-
ory (nchm),18 and the National Registry of Victims.
The Law also provides for an administrative programme for individual repa-
rations that updated, and ultimately replaced, the one created by Decree 1290. 
In addition to compensation or restitution, the new programme also provides 
for state support to guarantee rights related to education, health, housing, em-
ployment and income generation programmes, among others. The Law equal-
ly include interventions designed to return victims their dignity, to preserve 
memory, recover the truth, and create the necessary conditions so that the 
events they experienced are not repeated.
Article 3 of Law 1448 of 2011 also establishes that victims can access satis-
faction measures through Regional Victims’ Unit Centres or through the Cen-
tre for Historical Memory (chm) and judicial rulings. These measures aim to 
recognise the right of victims, their family members, and society in general 
to know the truth about the events, motives and circumstances of what hap-
pened. Thus, this component must cover two dimensions: the historical truth 
and memory reconstructed by state institutions as well as civil society; and the 
judicial truth, established through judicial proceedings against the perpetra-
tors of atrocious crimes. The latter is developed through the justice system, but 
it is understood as a complement to the historic truth.
 17 Law 1448, Article 25.
 18 The chapter on satisfaction measures in Law 1448 of 2011 included the creation of 
the Center for Historical Memory (cmh), which referred to the work done by the 
Historical Memory Group (gmh) under the National Commission for Reparation and 
Reconciliation (cnrr) created by the Justice and Peace Law, and whose working cycle 
ended in December 2011.
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It is worth nothing that Law 1448 also created a programme of collective 
reparation aimed at benefitting social and political groups and organizations, 
as well as communities. These groups are defined in a flexible manner to in-
clude any collective that is linked together through cultural ties, the zone or 
the territory they inhabit, or a common purpose.19
The peace agreement between the Government and the farc contains a 
special chapter on the rights of victims where the right to reparation is also 
recognised. The agreement created a new full set of mechanisms to deal with 
truth, justice, and the search for the disappeared. However, it did not create a 
new mechanism or rules to deal with reparation. Instead, the agreement fully 
validates the reparations system under Law 448 and adds some important nu-
ances such as that the farc would contribute conflict assets to the reparation 
process and that both the Government and the farc would carry out memory 
and satisfaction measures for the victims.20 The agreement also includes ter-
ritorial programmes with a development focus to help the most marginalised 
communities in the country.21
C Victims’ Road to Access Reparation
As a general rule, to access individual reparations, victims have to register in 
the Single Registry of Victims (Registro Unico de Víctimas – ruv). This can be 
done before any entity of the Ministerio Público (Public Ministry) and Om-
budsman Offices in Colombia or before any consulate of Colombia abroad. 
Victims should provide a declaration, which is subsequently revised by the Vic-
tims Unit that decides whether the person can be recognised as a victim. Part 
of the corroboration process is done by the Victims Unit by comparing the in-
formation received with that contained in the National Information Network 
to Assist and Repair Victims (Red Nacional de Información para la Atención y 
Reparación de Víctimas). The registration process is carried out on the basis of 
good faith. The Unit has 60 days to decide on the registration process. Victims 
can also be registered as a result of a judicial decision, for example, of a judg-
ment of the Justice and Peace Law or as part of land restitution process. If the 
person is registered as a victim, the Unit is responsible for supporting victims 
through the various processes established by the Law and other regulations to 
obtain individual reparation. The Unit is responsible for paying compensation, 
 19 Law 1448/ 2011, Articles 151– 152.
 20 Peace Agreement, points 5.1.3 and 5.1.4.
 21 Peace Agreement. See, Agreement on Comprehensive Rural Reform.
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but all other forms of reparation are provided by other institutions that form 
the snariv.
The effective implementation of individual and collective forms of repara-
tion depends on various factors but one that is central is the accurate calcu-
lation of the universe of victims to be redressed and the overall costs of the 
implementation of the drp. This is by no means an easy task.
In Colombia, when Law 1448 was approved by Congress, it was based on 
the expectation that there were approximately 4.5 million victims and that the 
total costs of implementing such an ambitious Law would be 54.9 billion Co-
lombian pesos.22 However, as of today, the Registry of Victims indicates that 
there are approximately 8.7 million victims, and registration continues. As of 
2018, the Colombian Government had set aside 76.9 billion pesos for the work 
of the drp.23
While there is a clear disconnect between the original projections and the 
actual number of victims that have registered, a key challenge for the system 
arose when the Constitutional Court changed the reparations that could be 
given to idp s.24 Basically, the Constitutional Court in upholding the right to 
reparation of idp victims, considered that they were also entitled to compen-
sation. This judgment has had a negative impact on the implementation of 
the Law as the number of victims eligible for compensation grew exponential-
ly. Equally, there is a general disconnect between the original projections and 
what the Law would require for reparation to be fully implemented.
While all forms of reparation are important to provide victims with ade-
quate reparation, the next sub- sections look at three forms of reparation in-
cluded in Colombia’s drp: compensation, rehabilitation and land restitution. 
This allows one to contrast simple forms of reparation and their implemen-
tation as in the case of compensation, with more complex measures such as 
rehabilitation and land restitution.
1 Compensation
Compensation is meant to be paid to indirect victims of enforced disappear-
ances or killings only and to direct victims of kidnapping, torture and other 
 22 Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Consejo Nacional de Politica Economica y Social, 
Documento conpes 3712, Plan de Financiación para la Sostenibilidad de la Ley 1448 de 
2011, 1 December 2011.
 23 Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011  “Ley 
de Víctimas y restitución de Tierras”, Quinto informe de Seguimiento al Congreso de la 
República, 17 August 2018, 29.
 24 Corte Constitucional, Colombia, Decision SU- 254/ 2013.
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cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, sexual violence, child recruitment and 
displacement. However, in relation to displacement as well as to indirect vic-
tims of enforced disappearances and killings, the payment is made to the fami-
ly unit and not to individual members of the family,25 as shown in  Table below:
Table 21.1 
Direct Victims Kidnapping 10,500 usd per individual  
(40 minimum monthly wages)
Injuries that result in permanent 
disability
10,500 usd per individual  
(40 minimum monthly wages)
Torture and cidt 7,900 usd per individual  
(30 minimum monthly wages)
Sexual violence 7,900 usd per individual  
(30 minimum monthly wages)
Forced recruitment of children 
who were released by the age of 18
7,999 usd per individual  
(30 minimum monthly wages)
Forced displacement 4,500 usd (17 minimum monthly 
wages per household)
Indirect Victims Forced disappearances 10,500 usd (40 minimum monthly 
wages per family to be divided 
between the family unit)
Killings 10,500 usd (40 minimum monthly 
wages per family to be divided 
between the family unit)
Up until 31 December 2017, a total of 759,341 victims had received compen-
sation under the drp for a total of 4,824,578 billion pesos.26 Current numbers 
indicate that about 10% of the approximately 7  million victims that should 
receive compensation, have been receiving it on a yearly basis, and indeed, 
 25 Other drp s have provided reparation to next of kin on different bases. See Ruth Rubio- 
Marín, Clara Sandoval and Catalina Díaz, ‘Repairing Family Members:  Gross Human 
Rights Violations and Communities of Harm’, in Ruth Rubio- Marín, The Gender of 
Reparations (NY: cup 2009), 215– 290.
 26 Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011  “Ley 
de Víctimas y restitución de Tierras”, Quinto informe de Seguimiento al Congreso de la 
República, 17 August 2018, 193.
AQ1: Please provide caption for Table 21.1
AQ1
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projections indicate that at this pace it will take 57 years to compensate this 
universe of victims.27
While almost 800,000 compensation payments in eight years of implemen-
tation of the Law is a significant figure that should not to be underestimated, 
the result is far from satisfactory. Certainly, it is very costly to provide compen-
sation to approx. 7 million victims (if we take into account those already paid 
and those who have died). Nevertheless, making such a payment should be 
facilitated by the fact that it is a one- time payment, and not a pension for life 
as was the case for certain gross human rights violations of the dictatorship in 
Chile. Furthermore, in Colombia, the majority of victims that are registered 
are, in principle, reachable. Security conditions may hinder the payment of 
compensation but that is not an issue that is faced by the system but rather by 
the victims who benefit from it.
If one compares the result of Colombia so far with actual compensation 
paid in Guatemala, for example, Colombia comes out well on the assessment. 
In Guatemala, of approximately 200,000 victims entitled to reparation, ap-
proximately 32,000 have received compensation.28 This was the number af-
ter 11 years of implementation of the National Reparation Programme. But in 
Guatemala, the financial and political conditions are rather different than in 
Colombia.
One could also compare the Colombian approach to the results of the Ger-
man Compensation Programme for Forced Labour. Then, the assessment of 
Colombia is less positive. Indeed, in the case of the German Compensation 
Programme, it provided compensation in two instalments to 1.6 million vic-
tims of forced labour across 89 states, between 2000 and 2007. The total cost 
of compensation was 5.2 billion euros, paid in equal shares by the German 
Government and German corporations.29
2 Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation for physical and mental health30 falls within the remit of the 
Ministry of Health through the papsivi. Nevertheless, the Victims Unit has also 
 27 Ibid, 19.
 28 Programa Nacional de Resarcimiento, Cantidad de beneficiarios por tipo de violación del 
2005– 2014 (Guatemala, pnr).
 29 Friederike Mieth and Günter Saathoff, ‘Introduction’ in Günter Saathoff, Uta Gerlant, 
Friederike Mieth and Norbert Wühler (eds), The German Compensation Program for 
Forced Labor: Practice and Experiences, (Berlin: Foundation Remembrance Responsibility 
Future (evz), 2017) 1– 12, 2.
 30 Article 135 of Law 1448.
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developed a psychosocial support programme for victims named the Strategy 
for Emotional Wellbeing (Estrategia de Recuperación Emocional - ere), partly 
due to the deficit in provision of this service by the Ministry of Health. While 
rehabilitation services were foreseen in Law 1448, they only began to be pro-
vided in 2014. Since then and up to 2018, 418,411 survivors have been provided 
with rehabilitation measures,31 when the expected universe of victims requir-
ing such services is approximately 3,472,453 victims.32 This means that 12.41% 
of the victims have received some form of rehabilitation.
It must be noted that the papsivi is available in various Departments in 
Colombia but does not fully reach all areas of the country. Even in areas where 
violence has been rampant, as in Antioquia and Valle del Cauca, not all their 
municipalities are covered by the papsivi.33 Furthermore, Departments have 
an obligation to make financial allocations to fund papsivi services but 12 out 
of 29 departments in the country have yet to make such contributions.34 The 
lack of adequate implementation of rehabilitation services in Colombia has 
even led the IACtHR to monitor compliance with its orders on rehabilitation 
in various judgments by joining them in nine cases related to victims of human 
rights violations that occurred during the armed conflict.35
While the implementation and provision of rehabilitation services through 
the papsivi faces enormous challenges, an important form of rehabilitation, 
that is collective in nature, was designed by the Victims Unit as a tool to re-
spond to the massive psychosocial harm caused in many communities. This 
programme has been called ‘Entrelazando’ which means ‘interweaving’. The 
 31 Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo a la Implementación de la Ley 1448 de 2011  “Ley 
de Víctimas y restitución de Tierras”, Quinto informe de Seguimiento al Congreso de la 
República, 17 August 2018, 113.
 32 Ibid, 119.
 33 Ibid, 115.
 34 This includes violent areas of the country where many victims are located like Meta, 
Choco, or Valle del Cauca. See, ibid, 117.
 35 The nine cases are: Case of the 19 Tradesmen v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Ser C No 109, 5 July 2004; Case of Gutiérrez Soler v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and 
Costs) Ser C No 132, 12 September 2005; Case of the “Mapiripán Massacre” v. Colombia 
(Merits, Reparations and Costs) Ser C No 134, 15 September 2005; Case of the Pueblo Bello 
Massacre v.  Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Ser C No 140, 31 January 2006; 
Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia (Preliminary objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs) Ser C No 148, 1 July 2006; Case of the La Rochela Massacre v. Colombia (Merits, 
Reparations and Costs) Ser C No 163, 11 May 2007, Case of Escué Zapata v.  Colombia 
(Merits, Reparations and Costs) Ser C No 165, 4 July 2007; Case of Valle Jaramillo et al. 
v. Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Ser C No 192, 27 November 2008 and the Case 
of Manuel Cepeda Vargas v. Colombia (Preliminary Exceptions, Merits and Reparations) 
Ser C No 213, 26 May 2010.
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object of the programme is to ensure that the social fabric can be reconstruct-
ed through the work carried out by different ‘interweavers’. Lina Rondon, who 
began and coordinated the programme at the Victims Unit indicates that ‘the 
process began as a strategy to understand and respond to the collective psy-
chosocial harms that were most evident in peasant communities between Oc-
tober 2012 and May 2016.’36
The programme has three key points of contact:  two leaders in the com-
munity, fictionally called Julia and Cristobal, who during the conflict, resisted 
the violence and kept on going; some professional interweavers that work lo-
cally with the community and the Victims Unit that articulates the process. 
Communication between these three elements of the network has helped to 
improve understanding of the different facets of harm and have also helped 
to facilitate four different processes aimed at rebuilding the community: col-
lective mourning, transforming the meaning of places plagued by horror and 
violence, rescuing social practices important for the community, living with 
each other and nurturing collective imaginaries.37
Two features of the programme stand out: first, that it has proven to be an 
effective form of rehabilitation for the communities where it has been imple-
mented despite being a simple and affordable form of intervention and sec-
ond, that it builds the social fabric placing the community and its members at 
the heart of the process. The fact that a social leader is the interweaver means 
that when the Victims Unit leaves the community, the process of healing and 
social cohesion can continue.
Rehabilitation is a crucial form of reparation for victims. Without it, many 
victims will not be able to exercise their right to justice or truth or become a 
meaningful agent in society.38 However, in Colombia as in many states rav-
aged by conflict, the provision of rehabilitation services faces many challeng-
es,39 making it difficult if not impossible to provide the services as required. 
 36 Lina Rondón, ‘Reconstruir el Tejido Social. Un Trabajo por Hacer con las Comunidades 
Afectadas y una Orientación Dirigida a Rehumanizar la Sociedad’, in Keilyn Julieth Sanches 
Espitia (ed) Entre Acuerdos y Desacuerdos: Memorias de una Paz en Disputa, (Bogota, UD 
Editorial 2018), 152.
 37 Ibid, 153– 154.
 38 Clara Sandoval, ‘Rehabilitation as a Form of Reparation Under International Law’, 
redress, 2009 and Clara Sandoval, ‘Reflections on the Transformative Potential of 
Transitional Justice and the Nature of Social Change in Times of Transition, in Roger 
Duthie and Paul Seils (eds), Justice Mosaics:  How Context Shapes Transitional Justice in 
Fractured Societies, (NY: ictj 2017), 166– 201, 190.
 39 Judith Bueno de Mesquita, Gen Sander and Paul Hunt, ‘Rehabilitation and the Right to 
Health in Times of Transition’ in (2016) 5(2) Intl Hum Rts L Rev (2016), 169– 193.
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Challenges include the high number of victims – the great majority of which 
are idp s; lack of quality coverage of the health system across the country and 
poor security conditions. However, programmes like Entrelazando show the 
potential for creative interventions that can help to empower victims and that 
may be helpful when there are financial constraints.
Probably the most successful comparative experience to date in providing 
health measures as rehabilitation, has been the still running Chilean prais 
System (Programa de Reparación y Atención Integral de Salud), set up in 199140 
as a result of a recommendation made by the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.41 The programme has provided services to three generations of 
beneficiaries – both direct and indirect victims – equivalent to approximate-
ly 800,000 registered victims. This programme not only engages with health 
services for the victims but also with memory and truth interventions, accom-
panying for example, the next of kin of persons who were disappeared during 
exhumations. Yet, even programmes of this breadth have faced challenges to 
provide reparation to some victims such as refugees or persons in exile.42 It 
must be noted that Chile was not transitioning from conflict to peace but from 
dictatorship to democracy.
3 Land Restitution Programme
Law 1448 established a mixed transitional mechanism to deal with the specif-
ic problem of land dispossession. The law created a Land Management Unit 
as well as special judges and chambers for land restitution. The Land Man-
agement Unit receives victims’ requests, supplements them with proactive 
investigation of the specific facts and general patterns of violence, and pres-
ents petitions on their behalf to the judges, in areas that have previously been 
declared by the Government to be zones affected by generalised violence. The 
land restitution decisions are rendered in an absolute four- month term,43 after 
a 30- day probation period, and cannot be appealed. The Law also considers 
monetary compensation payments for third parties who possess the land in 
 40 Elizabeth Lira, ‘Reflections on Rehabilitation as a Form of Reparation in Chile after 
Pinochet’s Dictatorship’, (2016) 5(2) Intl Hum Rts L Rev 194.
 41 Chilean National Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Report, Volume I, Part ii, 1991, 
1260– 1263.
 42 Garcia Lucero and Others v. Chile (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs) 
Ser C no 627, 28 August 2013.
 43 As of July 2016, according to data by the Unidad de Restitución, the average duration of 
this process in the judicial phase was 14 months. For an analysis of the duration of the 
processes in the administrative phase, please see:  Corte Constitutional, Sentence T- 415 
of 2013.
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good faith and for those victims to whom it would be impossible to restore 
their original assets. This compensation is paid, in whichever case, with do-
mestic public bonds, issued by the Government and managed by the National 
Bank, at the market value of the property at the moment of the ruling.
As of February 2019, the Land Management Unit reported that in the ad-
ministrative stage of land restitution there were a total of 120,876 requests 
recorded by the Dispossessed and Forcibly Abandoned Land Registry. These 
applications have been submitted by 84,005 individuals accounting for 110,007 
properties. 54,190 requests have already been processed: 44,602 were discard-
ed and the remaining 9,588 were adjudicated in 4,912 judicial sentences that 
have benefitted 45,000 people and covered 338,362 hectares of land. A further 
17,814 requests are still pending decision by the courts but have already been 
processed by the Unit.44
Regarding restitution processes for ethnic peoples’ territories, the Unit 
reports that as of February 2019, there were 126 cases requested or initiated 
ex officio:  60 in undergoing preliminary assessment, 52 lawsuits filed before 
the land restitution jurisdiction, and 101 precautionary measures ordered by 
 judges.45
The assessment of the reparations policy in a political transitional context 
like the Colombian one faces important methodological challenges and ideo-
logical and political disputes. An example of this is the disparity in the con-
clusions of the main land restitution evaluation reports. While some sectors 
report considerable success in the measures46, others show their dissatisfac-
tion regarding what they view as a poor or mediocre result in the implemen-
tation.47 The disparities have diverse origins. In some cases, differences are 
due to the scale of the measurements used (victimisation estimates, progress 
indicators – such as how much money has been invested, how many measures 
have been granted- , or the baseline). In other cases, it is due to the studies on 
 44 Land Restitution Unit, Land Restitution Statistics, 14 February 2019, <https:// www.resti-
tuciondetierras.gov.co/ estadisticas- de- restitucion- de- tierras> (accessed 8 April 2019).
 45 Land Restitution Unit, Land Restitution Statistics, ibid.
 46 According to the current Director of the Land Management Unit, the work of the sys-
tem has exceeded expectations in terms of numbers of cases managed in the admin-
istrative stage. The original estimate was of 9,500 processed cases per year. Between 
2012– 2018, the system processed 69,419 requests, which on average represents almost 
10,000 requests a year. Andrés Castro, ‘Política de restitución de tierras no ha cambiado,’ El 
Espectador, 25 March 2019, <https:// colombia2020.elespectador.com/ pais/ politica- de- 
restitucion- de- tierras- no- ha- cambiado- andres- castro> (accessed 26 March 2019).
 47 Jemima García- Godos and Henrik Wiig ‘Ideals and Realities of Restitution: the Colombian 
Land Restitution Programme’, (2018) 10(1) J Hum Rts Practice 40.
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victims’ perceptions, where a majority respond negatively to the question of 
whether they are satisfied with the reparation received.48
D An Assessment of Reparations for Victims of Mass Atrocities in 
Colombia
Reparation for victims of mass atrocities remains an unfinished business. Vic-
tims around the world continue to wait for reparation and the great majority of 
them die with an unfulfilled right and expectation.49 drp s have been set up to 
respond to this reality. They are considered to be more conducive to reparation 
for thousands if not millions of victims. They are meant to be victim- centred 
remedies that prevent victims from incurring unaffordable costs, or having to 
satisfy very high standards of proof that they suffered material and moral dam-
ages as a result of human rights or humanitarian law violations.50
However, after almost three decades of experiences around the world with 
such programmes as part of transitional justice efforts, the great majority of 
domestic reparation programmes continue to face enormous challenges to en-
sure that victims receive adequate, prompt and effective reparation. The great 
majority of them have simply failed the task.51 Very few could be considered to 
have fulfilled the right to reparation of their beneficiaries.
Important distinctions need to be drawn between reparation for victims of 
state- sponsored repression as in Chile or Argentina, which could be regarded 
as more successful programmes, and those domestic reparation programmes 
set up in countries moving away from conflict such as Colombia.52 In Chile 
and Argentina, the amount of victims was far smaller than in the latter Co-
lombian case, state institutions were in place and were strong and the political 
transition allowed reparation for victims of mass atrocities to gain traction. 
In conflict situations state institutions do not exist or are fragile; oftentimes 
they also lack technical expertise and cross- country reach. There are also other 
 48 For a comprehensive study on land restitution, see: Nelson Camilo Sánchez, ‘Tierra en 
Transición:  Justicia Transicional, restitución de tierras y política agraria en Colombia’, 
Colección Dejusticia, 2017.
 49 UN Special Rapporteur for the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees 
of non- Recurrence, Report to the UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/ 69/ 518, 14 October 
2014, para. 6.
 50 Ibid, para. 4.
 51 Pablo de Greiff (ed), The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005).
 52 Roger Duthie and Paul Seils (eds), Justice Mosaics: How Context Shapes Transitional Justice 
in Fractured Societies (NY: ictj 2017), 13.
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actors, particularly armed groups, that make the delivery of reparations even 
more challenging.53
Chile has provided reparation to victims of the dictatorship with a greater 
degree of success to that of states transitioning from armed conflict. Even to-
day, after almost thirty years since the domestic reparation programme began 
to work in Chile, it continues to provide some forms of reparation to victims.54 
Certainly, it has not been a perfect programme. Some victims have been ex-
cluded as is the case of refugees or those in exile but overall, the programme 
has reached out to victims, delivered the benefits and, over the years, has taken 
action to correct its shortcomings.
Other reparation programmes such as the German Compensation Pro-
gramme for Forced Labour indicate that reparation could be effectively de-
livered to victims.55 This programme was successful because there was a good 
calculation of victims, it focused only on compensation and the financial re-
sources to pay for it were in place. It also benefited from strong institutional/ 
operative frameworks to reach out to victims.
In other contexts, some of them conflict states, lack of reparation has been 
a feature of their transitional justice processes. South Africa, for example, has 
failed to fully deliver on reparation for victims even though the trc made very 
important recommendations on the subject, and the anc got to power.56 Lack 
of reparation in South Africa prompted, among others, the Khulumani litiga-
tion which brought other actors into the equation, like US courts, but arguably 
with no positive outcome.57 In Sierra Leone, victims are still waiting for repa-
ration despite the recommendations made by the truth commission. The few 
reparations that have taken place in Sierra Leone were primarily funded by the 
international community.58
Where is Colombia on this landscape and what are the lessons to be learnt 
from the Colombian experience? Law 1448 has been implemented since 2011. 
 53 Lars Waldorf, ‘Institutional Gardening in Unsettled Times:  Transitional Justice and 
Institutional Contexts’ in Duthie and Seils, ibid, 40– 83.
 54 Elizabeth Lira, ‘The Reparations Policy for Human Rights Violations in Chile’, in de Greiff 
(ed), The Handbook of Reparations (n 51).
 55 Clara Sandoval and Miriam Puttick, ‘Reparations for the Victims of Conflict in Iraq: Lessons 
Learned from Comparative Practice’, Minority Rights Group, 2017, 4.
 56 Chris Colvin, ‘Overview of the Reparations Program in South Africa’ in de Greiff, The 
Handbook of Reparations, (n 51) 176.
 57 Mia Swart, ‘Requiem for a Dream?: The Impact of Kiobel on Apartheid Reparations in 
South Africa’, (2015) 13(2) J Intl Crim J 353.
 58 ictj, ‘Report ad Proposals for the Implementation of Reparations in Sierra Leone’, 
2009, 14.
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This process has taken place in a rocky context that includes factors such as the 
failure of the Justice and Peace Law system to provide reparation to victims as 
decided by judges, several policies on idp s implemented in Colombia, sepa-
rate judgments from the IACtHR ordering diverse forms of reparation to vic-
tims of mass atrocities, the heavy involvement of the Colombian judiciary, and 
the negotiation and subsequent signature of the peace agreement between the 
Government and the farc.
While transitional justice mechanisms have been established in Colombia, 
including to provide reparation, the conflict has not fully ended. The presence 
of diverse layers of violence continue to ravage parts of the country. Ideological 
polarisation persists, and society in general has not fully come to terms with 
the idea that Colombia needs to move away from conflict and has to deal with 
the legacy of its past, including repairing the unspeakable harms suffered by 
more than 8 million victims, 7 million of which are idp s.
But Colombia, in contrast to other conflict- affected states, such as Sierra Le-
one, Liberia or the Central African Republic, has had a stable economy during 
this century with inflation below 4% and with economic growth. Nevertheless, 
it remains a country with one of the highest concentrations of income inequal-
ity59 and unequal land distribution in the continent.60
While economically speaking it would be very demanding for Colombia to 
pay the costs of its reparation efforts under Law 1448, it is not it’s financial 
inability what makes it the biggest challenge but rather the combination of 
other features such as the political deficit to support the programme, the lack 
of contributions from others than the state to finance reparation (for example, 
armed groups or economic actors), the persistence of conflict in various quar-
ters of the state, and the lack of institutional and technical capacity across the 
state apparatus, with notorious absence in the areas that have been ravaged by 
conflict.61
The results after eight years of implementation illustrate this reality. While 
the number of potential victims taken into account when drafting Law 1448 
basically doubled (moving approx. from 4 to 8 million), the reality is that not 
 59 Dane, ‘Boletin Tecnico, Pobreza Monetaria y Multidimensional en Colombia’, 2017, 
13, <https:// www.dane.gov.co/ files/ investigaciones/ condiciones_ vida/ pobreza/ bol_ 
pobreza_ 17.pdf> (accessed 8 April 2019).
 60 Ana María Ibánez and Juan Carlos Muñoz, ‘The Persistence of Land Concentration 
in Colombia:  What Happened Between 2000 and 2009?’, in Morten Bergsmo, César 
Rodríguez- Garavito, Pablo Kalmanovitz and Maria Paula Saffon (eds), Distributive Justice 
in Transitions (Oslo: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher 2010), 279.
 61 Alexander de Segovia, ‘Financing Reparations Programs: Reflections from International 
Experience,’ in de Greiff, The Handbook of Reparations, (n 51) 652.
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even 50% of the initial number in mind have received reparation in any of its 
forms up to 2019. Therefore, by 2021 when the Law would have been in place for 
a decade, Colombia would have not been able to provide reparation to victims 
according to its initial plans and more than 85% of its victims would still be 
waiting for reparation.
Colombia also designed a reparation programme that is off international 
charts. No other domestic reparation programme in the world is as ambitious 
and comprehensive. In a way, the Colombian effort was to respond, as far as 
possible, to a holistic view of what reparation for victims of armed conflict 
should be rather than to what was possible in an imperfect world.62
Its design was also strongly influenced by the jurisprudence on reparation of 
the IACtHR, and by its own local courts, which together have developed a very 
holistic view of reparation for mass atrocities. Nevertheless, when one looks at 
other conflict situations in the Americas and how drp s have been designed, 
no other programme replicates the Colombian approach. Guatemala or Peru, 
where the number of victims was not even 5% of the overall number of victims 
in Colombia (if idp s are included), have designed complex programmes that 
combine individual and collective forms of reparation and go beyond com-
pensation, but they do not include the same holistic approach and humani-
tarian measures as Law 1448. The most recent reparation programme to be set 
up in the region, that of El Salvador, is also modest in comparison. It covers a 
few human rights violations, specifically, torture (including sexual violence), 
killings and enforced disappearances. It provides various forms of reparation 
to victims. However, some of them, such as rehabilitation, are conditioned to 
available resources.63
Participation by victims during the approval of Law 1448 also influenced its 
content. At the time, the United Nations Development Programme promoted 
various regional dialogues between authorities and victims to discuss the con-
tent of the draft law. This also helped the Law become holistic. A consequence 
is that victims’ expectations have risen exponentially: they understand repa-
ration in a very holistic manner and are ready to challenge the conduct of the 
state for failure to implement the Law in their favour.
All of these important developments have also empowered victims who are 
mobilising, with the help of civil society organisations, to claim their right to 
reparation. However, some of this mobilisation has occurred because of the 
great frustration they experience given the lack of implementation of Law 
 62 Pablo de Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice’, (2012) 51 Nomos 31.
 63 Presidency of El Salvador, Decree 204/ 2013, Articles 2, 7 and 10.
566 Camilo Sánchez and Sandoval-Villalba
1448. Consequently, they are approaching national and international bodies 
to seek adjudication on reparation. This adds yet another layer of complexity 
to reparation in Colombia.64 These additional bodies are deciding on repara-
tion, not always in harmony with the standards applied under Law 1448, which 
arguably generates a further disservice to victims.
What would have been the alternative to the panorama present today in 
Colombia? Some scholars like Correa indicate that ‘a modest approach that 
acknowledges the state’s limited ability to provide reparations for the dimen-
sions of violations that were suffered by so many may be preferable, instead of 
overselling an effort that continues to leave many victims waiting.’65 And he 
adds ‘There is little merit in creating a comprehensive and broad reparations 
program if it is impossible to implement.’66 Based on this view, it would have 
been preferable to design a reparation programme that did not overpromise 
what it could achieve as this would have led to more targeted outcomes.
The Law is two years away from its expiry date in 2021, and reparation for 
victims remains an unfinished business. As we have learned from other experi-
ences worldwide, reparation for such atrocities cannot be fulfilled within a de-
cade, even if some of the measures could. Also, most of the work on reparation 
under a drp happens during its first five years of work as it is then when state 
political and financial support are more apparent as well as support from the 
international community. Equally, drp s, with holistic principles underpinning 
their work, last for at least a generation as the Chilean case shows. Therefore, 
the extension of the Law is necessary. The year 2021 offers an important oppor-
tunity for policy makers, victims and civil society to come together to propose 
amendments to the law bearing in mind the lessons learned.
The potential reform of Law 1448 should take into account how difficult it is 
to predict the trajectory of a public policy of this nature. Also reform must bear 
in mind that there is a long- standing institutional experience that carries a 
baggage of both positive and negative aspects. Two complex lessons that have 
been learnt require some elaboration: the importance of judicial engagement 
with reparation measures and the experience of dealing with idp s.
In all types of states, including consolidated democracies, tensions exist be-
tween the branches of public power. However, in a state with chronic institu-
tional weaknesses, these tensions are more frequent and run deeper. This is the 
 64 Clara Sandoval, ‘Two steps forward, one step back:  reflections on the jurisprudential 
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 65 Correa, ‘From Principles to Practice’ (n 3), 28.
 66 Ibid.
Lessons Learned from the Colombian Victims’ Reparation System 567
case in Colombia, but with two additional contextual factors. The first is an en-
trenched legal culture which, in the absence of a political consensus, causes pow-
erful actors to convert their disputes into legal battles. The second tension occurs 
between traditional or ordinary institutions and transitional mechanisms.
Due to these factors, the Colombian judiciary has been a fundamental actor 
in the Colombian transition, including on the topic of reparations. A potential 
reform should take into account at least three positive aspects of this judicial 
intervention. First, Colombia’s judiciary has embedded the right to reparations 
in domestic law by recognising specific international standards, mostly those 
coming from the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. Second, courts have played a 
fundamental role in encouraging the participation of victims in the design, 
planning and monitoring of reparation policies. And third, the courts have 
confronted the culture of state non- compliance of the law by creating innova-
tive monitoring processes of their decisions.67
However, judicial intervention in a process of mass reparation has also sig-
nificant challenges. Different judges could adjudicate on individual harm and 
come up with different reparation standards per case, which would delay repa-
ration massively, and generate tensions and harm between victims as has hap-
pened in the case of the Justice and Peace Law. Judges could also take decisions 
that change and expand the reparation policy as happened in Colombia with 
the decision of the Constitutional Court to uphold the right to compensation 
of idp s.68 Finally, there are also questions as to the knowledge and capacity 
of judges to both order complex forms of reparation, such as rehabilitation 
or property restitution, and monitor the work of a complex web of actors and 
policies in the country.
This puts on the table an important question related to the kind of co- 
existence between the judiciary, nationally and internationally, and drp s. 
Colombia has an opportunity in 2021 to consider how best to harmonise this 
relationship.
Additional institutional experience, that should inform the reform process, 
relates to the efforts to provide reparations to idp s. According to unhcr, 
 67 Two interesting examples are the Constitutional Court’s monitoring process of its deci-
sions regarding forced displacement. See Cesar Augusto Rodríguez & Diana Rodríguez 
Franco, Radical Deprivation on Trial:  The Impact of Judicial Activism n Socioeconomic 
Rights in the Global South, (Cambridge University Press 2015), and the monitoring pro-
cesses of the land restitution sentences and decisions. See, Aura Bolívar, Laura Gabriela 
Gutiérrez, Nelson Camilo Sánchez and Rodrigo Uprimny, ‘Debates sobre la Acción de 
Restitución’, Colección Dejusticia, 2017.
 68 Corte Constitucional, Decision SU- 254/ 2013.
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Colombia has the second highest number of displaced persons worldwide after 
Syria. Of the 7.9 million displaced persons in Colombia, 7.7 are internally dis-
placed persons, which is 1.5 million more than the group of internally displaced 
persons in Syria.69 This means that out of the 40 million internally displaced 
persons in the world, Colombia has a 19.25% share. Given the magnitude of the 
problem, the first institutional responses began two decades ago – in 1997 with 
the adoption of a law regarding forced displacement (Law 387/ 1997).
However, today, many of the practical challenges remain just as before, such 
as whether it is possible to provide reparation to idp s.70 Reparation measures 
are complex, take place over a prolonged period of time, and happen in paral-
lel and often in an intertwined manner with other state interventions such as 
humanitarian assistance, development or the satisfaction of economic, social 
and cultural rights. As a result, the state has had to address the debate regard-
ing the distinctions between these measures so as not to dilute the right to rep-
aration of idp s. Drawing distinctions between various measures is a challeng-
ing exercise.71 Even more complex is the implementation of these measures in 
practice.72 At the same time, given the reality of budgetary and institutional 
limitations, but also of opportunities to put in place better interventions, it is 
necessary to craft strategies so that each of these measures reinforces the oth-
ers. Colombia offers important opportunities to put together a holistic link be-
tween these interventions given the content of the peace agreement between 
the government and the farc.
Secondly, Law 1448 put the snariv in place with various branches and com-
petencies to provide a range of interventions, from assistance to reparation. One 
positive aspect of this system has been the involvement of diverse actors in the 
policies related to victims. This broader involvement can lead to greater owner-
ship of the measures and policy within state institutions. However, it also opens 
the door to the failures of these networks’ own coordination. This aspect should 
be one of the main concerns of the reform process. Particularly, how to create 
better coordination with local authorities, and how to empower them while pro-
viding relevant technical capacity so that the system can become self- sustainable.
 69 unhcr, Global Trends Report, 2017, 6.
 70 Report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, 
‘International Displacement and Transitional Justice’, UN Doc A/ 73/ 173, 17 July 2018.
 71 Naomi Roht- Arriaza and Katharine Orlovsky, ‘A Complementary Relationship: Reparations 
and Development’ in Pablo de Greiff and Roger Duthie (eds), Transitional Justice and 
Development: Making Connections, (NY, ictj/ Social Science Research Council 2009), 170– 
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Finally, the question of when the idp s’ policy cycle can be closed still lingers. 
As of the date of the writing of this chapter, the Colombian Constitutional Court 
has continued to monitor the situation, to the extent that it still considers that an 
unconstitutional state of affairs remains in place. Certainly, as has been noted by 
experts on idp s, addressing their injuries includes providing durable solutions 
that are part and parcel of reparation but also go beyond reparation as typical-
ly framed. Proposals for reform have to consider how effective the country has 
been in delivering durable solutions to idp s, what has been the contribution of 
Law 1448 towards that purpose and how best to achieve that goal in the future.73
E Conclusions
Colombia has crafted a highly ambitious drp under Law 1448 that is not com-
parable to any similar programme worldwide. It constitutes a holistic reflec-
tion of international law. However, the implementation gap is of huge pro-
portions. After eight years of implementation approximately 10% of its target 
population have received compensation or rehabilitation. This reminds us that 
the challenge for the future is immense.
The year 2021 will mark the tenth anniversary of the Law and the end of its 
lifespan. This offers a unique opportunity to amend the Law and extend its life. 
To this end, relevant bodies of the snariv, and the Commission on Follow Up of 
Law 1448/ 2011, should make an evidence- based study to demonstrate the areas 
where the implementation of the Law has been successful and those where prob-
lems have been encountered. Bearing in mind the lessons learned, it is important 
that a national consensus takes place around the idea that no new forms of rep-
aration would be added to the Law but rather to consider how best to articulate 
the existing ones in a way that empowers victims and maximises their impact.
Crucial for the future is how to ensure that not only the state bears the costs 
of reparations but also that other actors contribute to the process. In Colombia 
much more could be done to ensure that this is the case. It is one of the areas 
where the state has failed to make this happen, at its own expense.
Given the massive delays that have taken place so far, it is crucial to put in 
place some prioritisation criteria such as a territorial approach to victims, or to 
those victims who find themselves in an especially vulnerable situation so as to 
provide them with some forms of reparation as promptly as possible, bearing 
in mind the ability of those forms of reparation to have a positive impact in 
their lives such as rehabilitation for physical and mental health.
 73 UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, (n 70), 33.
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It is also crucial to reconceptualise reparation so that some of its forms, like 
satisfaction, become more visible. Reparation can be better articulated to dig-
nify victims and open opportunities for change in their communities and their 
lives. Key to this success would be the collaboration with civil society organ-
isations. However, state institutions can also play a pivotal role in this regard 
by providing victims with an experience of the reparation system, as well as 
of transitional justice mechanisms that dignify them. Sometimes, it is not that 
much about how much to give a person or a community but how you treat 
them (the experience they have) that can make a lasting difference for victims.
Equally important is the work on collective reparation to help communities 
move forward. Well implemented collective reparations that have been devel-
oped on the basis of consultations with victims have the potential to help not 
only communities but also individual members of the community. Providing 
reparation to Afro- descendants and indigenous peoples is one of the biggest 
pending debts in Colombia. Collective reparation offers a meaningful form of 
redress for these groups.
While the ambitious spirit of the Law should be maintained, its execution 
needs to be planned with greater realism, and must duly entail a real effort on 
the part of the state to comply with it. To achieve this, Colombia requires a so-
cietal agreement on reparations for victims of the conflict, in which decisions 
are based on evidence and include the voices of different stakeholders, espe-
cially victims. Once an agreement is reached, the model should not be subject-
ed to large- scale modifications (including the inclusion of new provisions or 
new categories of beneficiaries). New problems should be addressed by com-
plementary arrangements or parallel interventions. This may give the entities 
in charge of the programme an opportunity to focus on actual  implementation.
Finally, the Law could be very ambitious but Colombia, despite its armed 
conflict and all its consequences, is a country that is resilient by nature and 
capable to achieve what many believe to be simply impossible. Colombia has 
a pending debt. It has to show in the future that reparation for victims matters 
and that it is ready to do what it takes to achieve it.
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